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RECENT DECISIONS
Under another and possibly out-moded viewpoint,10 relief will
depend on facts extrinsic to the meaning acquired by the name. Here
the test is: would a reasonably prudent purchaser probably be con-
fused as to the source of the goods or services. 1  Here such ele-
ments as good faith, geographical location, relative size, the products
or services involved and so on become important.
The court in the instant case applied the "prudent purchaser"
test and based its decision on the ground that defendants' own name,
coupled with its established reputation in the local restaurant trade,
was sufficient to distinguish the two hotels and to obviate any reason-
able possibility of local confusion. This conclusion was buttressed
by taking judicial notice of the "undoubted" existence of other hotels
named "New Yorker" and of the actual existence of other hotels
which are operated in different cities although under substantially
identical names.1 2
It is submitted that the addition of defendants' name, even with
their local reputation as restaurateurs, is an insufficient distinction.
They could as easily secure the benefits of that reputation to their
hotel business without using plaintiff's name. With "all infinity" to
choose from,' 3 why permit the use of "New Yorker" for a hotel in
Kansas City when it is so flagrantly fictitious? 14
Perhaps more cogent is the precedent established permitting any
number of "Hotels New Yorker" distinguished only by the owner's
name. The protection of plaintiff's name would then be so narrowly.
circumscribed both as to area and as to trade that plaintiff's property
in its name would be virtually destroyed and its reputation neces-
sarily injured.
. J. M.
NATURALIZATION - GOOD MORAL CHARACTER AS A CONDITION
PRcEDENT.--Petitioner, a tavern keeper, was a native Syrian, fifty-
eight years old, a resident of the United States and Louisiana for
forty-six years, married and the father of eight American-born chil-
10 See the opinion of Learned Hand, J., in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler
Safe Co., 7 F. 2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925).
"American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1926); Howe
Scale Company v. Wyckoff, Seamans and Benedict, 196 U. S. 118 (1905).
Accord, Eastern Construction Co. v. Eastern Engineering Corp., 246 N. Y.
459, 159 N. E. 397 (1927).
22 But cf. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., Inc., et al. v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Corp.,
66 F. Supp. 720 (S. D. Fla. 1946) (a Florida hotel enjoined on behalf of a
Newv York hotel).
13 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd and Co., supra note 9 at 75.
'4See La Republique Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs, 107 Fed. 459
(2d Cir. 1901).
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dren. He was denied citizenship on the ground of lack of good moral
character because of six convictions for violation of state and federal
liquor laws between the years 1923 and 1942. Held, judgment for
petitioner. An alien who raised and educated a large and happy
family which was well behaved and well thought of in the com-
munity, was of good moral character, despite convictions for viola-
tion of state and federal liquor laws more than five years before his
application for citizenship. Petition of Gani, 86 F. Supp. 683 (W. D.
La. 1949).
In accordance with its constitutional power 1 Congress has estab-
lished the requirements for naturalization of aliens.2  Obtaining citi-
zenship through this established procedure is a "privilege" and not
a "right." 3 In addition to the standard procedures to be followed,
petitioner must show that he is of good moral character.4 The burden
of so proving is upon the petitioner 5 and all reasonable doubts are
resolved in favor of the United States."
The standard of good moral character is not measured by con-
ventional formality 7 but rather according to the usages of the society
in which the applicant lives 8 and in fact need not be of the highest
degree of moral excellence. 9 What constitutes good moral character
will vary with each succeeding generation. 10 Starting with conduct
which was first noted to be that of the "average man of the country" 1 1
it has later come to be known as the conduct of the "average man," 12
or of the "average citizen of the community," 13 or defined by refer-
ence to the "living law." 14
1 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8(4) : "The Congress shall have power ...
to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . .. ."
2 Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1142 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 707 (1946).
3 United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127 (E. D. Mich. 1941).
4 Nationality Act of 1940, supra note 2: "(a) No person . . . shall be
naturalized unless such petitioner ... (3) . . . has been and still is a person
of good moral character.. . ."; Petition of Zele, 140 F. 2d 773 (2d Cir. 1944).
5 lt re Jensen, 11 F. 2d 414 (E. D. La. 1926).6 United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463 (1928).
7 Petitions of Rudder, 159 F. 2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 Petition of R, 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. C. Mass. 1944).
9 In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561, 563 (E. D. Wisc. 1910) : "It need not rise
above the level of the common mass of people."
10 re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, No. 13,234 (C. C. D. Ore. 1878).
11 Ibid. at 921: "The standard may vary from one generation to another,
and probably the average man of the country is as high as it can be set"
12 It re Hopp, szapra note 9 at 563: "A good moral character is one that
measures up as good among the people of the community in which the party
lives; that is up to the standard of the average citizen ... such a reputation
as will pass muster with the average man."
13 In re Mogus, 73 F. Supp. 150, 152 (W. D. Pa. 1947) : "Good moral char-
acter . . . results from acts and conduct of an individual, and is of such a
character as measures up to the standards of the average citizens of the
community. .. ."
14 See note 8 supra. Would the community believe the act reprehensible?
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Though good moral character can be defined generally, only the
acts and conduct of an individual will ultimately give it meaning. 5
An alien guilty of murder was denied citizenship despite good moral
character during the immediately preceding five-year-period' 6 and
so, too, was one found guilty of manslaughter. 17 A petitioner mar-
ried to the guilty party in a divorce action 18 and another who com-
mitted but one act of adultery during the five-year-period preceding
application ' 9 as well as those generally guilty of adultery 20 have
been denied citizenship. Among those applicants also considered not
to be of good moral character are those guilty of bigamy,21 or those
who have procured invalid rabbinical divorces,22 but an incestuous
marriage 23 or being guilty of fornication 24 has been held not to be
a bar. Further excluded from naturalization for the lack of good
moral character are persons guilty of abandonment,25 perjury,26 being
a "pimp," 27 smuggling opium,28 maintaining a house of prostitu-
5Inre Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128 (N. D. Cal. 1943).
2' In re Ross, 188 Fed. 685 (C. C. P. A. 1911) (it is the court's duty to take
into account the whole career and conduct of the applicant). Contra:
Repcuille v. United States 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In re Balestrieri,
59 F. Supp. 181 (N. D. _ial. 1945) (the petitioner was convicted of murder
in the first degree and later pardoned, was recommended solely on the ground
of good moral character for five years); In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975
(S. D. Cal. 1943) (petitioner was guilty of negligent homicide).
17In re Caroni, 13 F. 2d 954 (N. D. Cal. 1926). "The defense is more
indicative of the applicant's true character than is any amount of precautionary
and decorous conduct following on the heels of parole." Contra: Daddona v.
United States, 170 F. 2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1948). "Good behavior during in-
carceration may be one indication of the fitness of the applicant to assume the
duties of citizenship."
18 Petition of Axelrod, 25 F. Supp. 415 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). In New
York under Section 8 of the Domestic Relations Law the guilty party in a
divorce action is not allowed to remarry unless the divorce is modified by the
court.
'9 Estrin v. United States, 80 F. 2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935).
20 Petition of F, 73 F. Supp. 655 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) ; In re Falck, 24 F.
Supp. 672 (D. C. Cir. 1938); United States v. Unger, 26 F. 2d 114 (S. D.
N. Y. 1928). Contra: Petitions of Rudder et al., 159 F. 2d 695 (2d Cir.
1947).
21United States v. Intrieri, 56 F. Supp. 374 (M. D. Pa. 1944); United
States v. Marafioti, 43 F. Supp. 45 (S. D>. N. Y. 1942).
22 United States v. Zaltzman, 19 F. Supp. 305 (W. D. N. Y. 1937) ; In re
Spiegel, 24 F. 2d 605 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) (petitioner acquired a rabbinical
divorce from his wife still in Poland and considered valid there and remarried.
Under the New York Constitution the divorce was invalid and the petitioner was
considered to be living in bigamy). Contra: In re Schlau, 136 F. 2d 480 (2d
Cir. 1943).
23 United States v. Francisco, 164 F. 2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947); Petition of
Lieberman, 50 F. Supp. 121 (E. D. N. Y. 1943) (petitioner married her uncle
in New York, but remarried in Rhode Island where such a relationship is not
considered incestuous).
24 See note 8 mipra.
25 See note 13 supra; In re Sigelman, 268 Fed. 217 (E. D. Mo. 1920).
26 See note 10 supra.
27 United States v. Raverat, 222 Fed. 1018 (D. Mont. 1915).
28 Petition of Gabin, 60 F. Supp. 750 (N. D. Cal. 1945).
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tion,29 concealing arrests,8 0 making false statements under oath,3'
bribing public officials, 32 smuggling aliens,83 violating national pro-
hibition laws, 34 or other liquor laws,3 5 or having a long list of arrests.36
Even one's failure to support an illegitimate child 37 or having had a
divorce decree entered against him for his "cruel and barbarous
treatment" 3  has been deemed conduct unbecoming good moral
character.
A search for a definite pattern or an absolute test in the above
cases will prove fruitless. This is due to the fact that there is little
precedent upon which the federal district and circuit courts can act
because of the relatively few cases that have been before the Supreme
Court despite the many problems provoked by individual petitions.
Further, since these courts are not bound by each other's decisions,
judges, when faced with the same or similar fact situations do not
decide alike on the law. Individual mitigating circumstances are
always considered and ultimately each case is decided upon the merits
of its own fact situation.
A. B. F.
29 In re Kornstein, 268 Fed. 172, 173 (E. D. Mo. 1920). "There are some
offenses against morals that must be held to permanently bar an alien from
citizenship." United States v. Leles, 236 Fed. 784 (N. D. Cal. 1916).30 Del Guercio v. Pupko, 160 F. 2d 799 (9th Cir. 1947); United States
v. Palmeri, 52 F. Supp. 226 (E. D. N. Y. 1943).
31 Petition of Ledo, 67 F. Supp. 917 (D. C. R. I. 1946)
32 In re De Mayo, 26 F. Supp. 996 (W. D. Mo. 1938).
33 United States v. Clifford, 89 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir. 1937) ; In re Nybo, 42
F. 2d 727 (6th Cir. 1930).
34 United States v. Villaneuva, 17 F. Supp. 485 (D. C. Nev. 1936) ; In re
Bonner, 279 Fed. 789 (D. C. Mont. 1922).
35 IX re Trum, 199 Fed. 361, 363 (W. D. Mont. 1912). "Defiance of the
established order and of the mandates of legal tribunals declaratory thereof.
constitutes bad citizenship, bad behavior and if wilfully persisted in, indicates
a perverted moral character." But cf. notes 9 and 15 (applicant kept saloon
open on Sunday in violation of liquor laws which were never enforced because
they were adverse to public sentiment).
36 In re Taran, 52 F. Supp. 535 (D. C. Minn. 1943). But cf. United States
v. Dwyer, 170 Fed. 686 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909); In re Bookschnis, 61 F. Supp.
751, 753 (D. C. Ore. 1945). Petitioner was convicted of violating the I.C.C.
Act on forty-two counts. "Distinctions between acts involving moral turpi-
tude and economic policy, and between acts recognized as criminal at all times
in all countries, and those which are simply violations of sumptuary, financial,
or war regulations should be maintained. . . . there was no essential im-
morality involved in the actions of defendant."
37 United States v. Konevitch, 67 F. Supp. 250 (M. D. Pa. 1946).
38 Application of Polivka, 30 F. Supp. 67 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
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